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1 Introduction
Classical social choice studies problems where a xed set of agents have to choose an
outcome from a given set of social outcomes, and agents have preferences only on the set
of outcomes. However, there are settings where, depending on the chosen outcome, some
agents may not want to remain in the society. For instance, membership of a political party
may depend on the positions that the party takes on issues like the death penalty, abortion,
or the possibility of allowing the independence of a region of the country. A professor in a
department may consider to look for a position in another university if he considers that
the recruitment of the department has not being satisfactory to his standards. Hence, to
be able to deal with such situations the classical social choice model has to be modied to
include explicitly the possibility that members may leave the society as the consequence of
the chosen outcome.
There is a large literature that has already considered explicitly, in specic settings, the
dependence of the nal society on the choices made by the initial society.1 Those papers
study alternative models in terms of the voting methods under which members choose the
social outcome and the timing under which members reconsider their membership. In this
note (as we also do in the companion paper Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2016)) we look
at the general setting without being specic about the two issues. We do that by considering
that the set of alternatives are all pairs formed by a subset of the original society (an element
in 2N ; the subset of agents that will remain in the society) and an outcome in X. Then,
we assume that agentspreferences are dened over the set of alternatives 2N  X and
satisfy two natural requirements. First, each agent has strict preferences between any two
alternatives, provided the agent belongs to at least one of the two corresponding societies.
Second, each agent is indi¤erent between two alternatives, provided the agent is not a
member of any of the two corresponding societies; namely, agents do not care about the
outcome chosen by societies they do not belong to.
We consider rules that operate on this restricted domain of preference proles by select-
ing, for each prole, an alternative (a nal society and an outcome). In Bergantiños, Massó,
and Neme (2016) we characterize the class of strategy-proof, unanimous and non-bossy rules
as the family of all serial dictator rules.
1See for instance Barberà, Maschler and Shalev (2001), Barberà and Perea (2002), and Berga, Bergan-
tiños, Massó and Neme (2004, 2006).
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For applications where the prole is common knowledge (and hence, the revelation of
agents preferences is not an strategic issue) we focus on internal stable and consistent
rules (see Thomson (1994, 2007) and Bergantiños, Massó and Neme (2015) for the study of
consistent rules in other social choice settings). Internal stability is a minimal requirement
of individual rationality, and it is a desirable property whenever membership is voluntary
(i.e., nobody can force an agent to remain in the society if the agent does not want to do
so). A rule is consistent if the following property holds. Apply the rule to a given prole
and consider the new problem where the new society is formed by the chosen subset of
agents at the original prole. A consistent rule chooses at the subprole of preferences of
the agents that remain members of the society the same alternative. Thus, a consistent
rule does not require to reapply the rule after an alternative has been chosen.
We adapt well-known voting methods to our setting, with the goal of making them
either internally stable or consistent, or both. We show that plurality voting and the Borda
method do not satisfy consistency. However, approval voting not only satises internal
stability and consistency but it also satises e¢ ciency, neutrality and participation (which
requires individual rationality for all agents, not only for those agents remaining in the
society). Finally, we show that the Condorcet winner is internal stable, consistent, e¢ cient,
anonymous, neutral and satises participation at those proles where an alternative beats
all other alternatives by majority voting.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. Section 3 contains
the denitions of the properties of rules that we will be interested in. Section 4 contains the
analysis of well-known rules from the point of view of their internal stability and consistency
properties.
2 Preliminaries
This section follows closely Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2016). Let N = f1; :::; ng
be the set of agents, where n  2; and let X be the set of possible outcomes. We are
interested in situations where some agents may not be part of the nal society, perhaps
as the consequence of the chosen outcome. To model such situations, let A = 2N X be
the set of (social and nal) alternatives and assume that each agent i 2 N has preferences
over the set of possible alternatives A. We will often use the notation a for a generic
alternative (S; x) 2 A; i.e., a  (S; x), a0  (S 0; x0); and so on. Let Ri denote agent is
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(weak) preference over A; where for any pair of alternatives a; a0 2 A; aRia0 means that
agent i considers alternative a to be at least as good as alternative a0: Let Pi and Ii denote
the strict and indi¤erence relations induced by Ri over A, respectively; namely, for any
pair of alternatives a; a0 2 A; aPia0 if and only if aRia0 and :a0Ria; and aIia0 if and only
if aRia0 and a0Ria: We assume that agents do not care about alternatives whenever they
do not belong to their corresponding nal societies and they are not indi¤erent between
pairs of alternatives whenever they do belong to at least one of the two corresponding nal
societies. Namely, we assume that agent is preferences Ri over A satisfy the following two
properties: for all x; y 2 X and S; T 2 2N ;
(P.1) if i =2 S [ T then (S; x) Ii (T; y) ; and
(P.2) if i 2 S [ T and (S; x) 6= (T; y) then either (S; x)Pi (T; y) or (T; y)Pi (S; x) :
Let Ri be the set of preferences of agent i 2 N over A satisfying (P.1) and (P.2), and let
R = i2NRi be the set of (preference) proles.
We denote the subset of alternatives that agent i is indi¤erent to any alternative for
which i is not a member of the corresponding nal society by
[?]i = fa 2 A j aIi (?; x) for some x 2 Xg :
By (P.1), (?; x)Ii(?; y) for all x; y 2 X and [?]i is the indi¤erence class generated by the
empty society. Observe that [?]i may be at the top of is preferences. With an abuse of
notation we often treat, when listing a preference ordering, the indi¤erence class [?]i as if
it were an alternative; for instance, given Ri and a 2 A we write aRi[?]i to represent that
aRia
0 for all a0 2 [?]i :
The top of Ri; denoted by  (Ri) ; is the set of all best alternatives according to Ri;
namely,
 (Ri) = f(S; x) 2 A j (S; x)Ri (T; y) for all (T; y) 2 Ag :
A rule is a social choice function f : R ! A selecting, for each prole R 2 R, an
alternative f(R) 2 A: To be explicit about the two components of the alternative chosen
by f atR; we will often write f (R) as (fN (R) ; fX (R)), where fN (R) 2 2N and fX (R) 2 X:
To clarify the model, we relate it with the two examples used in the introduction. The
initial members of the political party correspond to the agents, the set of outcomes to the
set of choices and the set S, if the chosen alternative is (S; x), to the set of nal members of
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the party that still want to stay after it supports outcome x. Similarly, all professors in the
department correspond to the agents, the set of outcomes to all subsets of hired candidates
and the set S; if the chosen alternative is (S; x); to the set of professors who remain in the
department after x has been selected.
3 Properties of rules
In this section we present several properties that a rule may satisfy. The rst three impose
conditions on f at each prole.
A rule f : R! A is e¢ cient if it always selects a Pareto optimal allocation.
Efficiency For each R 2 R there is no a 2 A with the property that aRif(R) for
all i 2 N and aPjf(R) for some j 2 N:
The next property is related to the stability of a rule f : R! A; and captures the idea
that agents are able to exit a society at their free will. Internal stability says that no agent
belonging to the nal society would prefer to leave it.
Internal stability For all R 2 R and all i 2 fN (R) ; f (R)Pi [?]i.
A rule satises the property of participation if all agents prefer to be involved in the
election of the social alternative rather than to exclude themselves by not submitting their
preferences; namely, participation guarantees that the procedure to choose the social alter-
native is individually rational.
Participation For all R 2 R and all i 2 N , f (R)Ri[?]i:
Although by denition, participation seems stronger than internal stability, they are
equivalent indeed.
Lemma 1 A rule satises participation if and only if is internally stable.
Proof It is evident that participation implies internal stability. Assume f satises inter-
nal stability and letR 2 R and i 2 N: Since fNnfig
 
RjNnfig
  Nn fig ; (fNnfig  RjNnfig ; fX(RjNnfig)) 2
[?]i :We distinguish between two cases. First, i 2 fN (R) : Since f satises internal stability,
f (R)Pi [?]i : Second, i =2 fN (R) : Hence, f (R) 2 [?]i :Thus, f(R)Ri [?]i :
The next three properties impose conditions on a rule by comparing the alternatives
chosen by the rule at two di¤erent proles. A rule is anonymous if the names of the
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agents are not relevant to select the alternative. To dene it formally, let  : N ! N be
a permutation (one-to-one mapping) of the set of agents. Given i 2 N; (i) is the agent
assigned to i after applying the permutation  to N: The set of all permutations  : N ! N
will be denoted by : For  2  and 1  k  n; we write k to denote the agent  1(k):
Let S 2 2N be a subset of agents and  be a permutation of N . Denote by (S) the subset
of agents associated to S by ; namely, (S) = fi 2 N j (j) = i for some j 2 Sg: Let
R 2 R be a prole and  2  be a permutation of the set of agents N . Denote by R
the new prole where for all i 2 N; agent (i) has the preference Ri after replacing in the
preference Ri each alternative (S; x) by ((S); x):
Anonymity For all R 2 R and all permutation  2  of the set of agents, fN (R) =
(fN(R)) and fX(R) = fX (R) :
Remark 2 In our setting anonymity and e¢ ciency are incompatible (no rule satises
both properties). To see that consider the case where N = f1; 2g, X = fxg ; and R1 and
R2 are as follows: (f1g ; x)P1 [?]1 P1 (N; x) and (f2g ; x)P2 [?]2 P2 (N; x) : If f is e¢ cient,
f (R) 2 f(f1g ; x) ; (f2g ; x)g : Suppose f(R) = (f1g ; x) ; i.e., fN(R) = f1g (the other case
proceeds similarly, and hence we omit it). Consider the permutation  where (1) = 2 and
(2) = 1: Since (f1g) = f2g; R = (R2; R1) and the sets of e¢ cient alternatives at R and
at R coincide, fN(R) = f1g 6= f2g = (f1g) = (fN(R)). Hence, f is not anonymous.
A rule is neutral if the name of the outcome does not play any role in selecting the social
alternative. To dene it formally, let  : X ! X be a permutation of the set of outcomes.
Given x 2 X; (x) is the outcome assigned to x after applying the permutation  to X:
The set of all permutations  : X ! X will be denoted by : For  2  and x 2 X; we
write x to denote the outcome  1(x): Let Y  X be a non-empty subset of outcomes and
 be a permutation of X: Denote by (Y ) the subset of outcomes associated to Y by ;
namely, (Y ) = fx 2 X j (y) = x for some y 2 Y g: Let R 2 R be a prole and  2  be
a permutation of the set of outcomes X: Denote by R the new prole where for all i 2 N
the preference Ri is obtained from Ri after replacing each pair (S; x) by (S; (x)):
Neutrality For allR 2 R and all permutation  2  ofX; f(R) = (fN(R); (fX(R)):
A rule is consistent if the following requirement holds. Apply the rule to a given prole
and consider the subset of agents that are members of the chosen society. Construct the
new subprole of preferences restricted to this new set of chosen agents. Then, the rule does
not require to modify the chosen alternative because when applied to the new subprole the
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new alternative coincides with the alternative chosen at the original prole. To dene the
property formally, we rst need an additional notation. Given a prole R = (Ri)i2N 2 R
and a subset of agents S  N we denote by RjS the restriction of R to 2S. Namely, given
i 2 T \ T 0; T [ T 0  S and x; y 2 X; (T; x)  RjSi (T 0; y) if and only if (T; x)Ri (T 0; y) :
Second, we will have to specify how a given rule can be applied to a subprole. One way of
doing so it is to see a rule f : R! A as it were a family of rules. Given a nonempty subset
S 2 2Nnf?g; denote by RS the set of subproles RjS = (Rji)i2S where each Rji, i 2 S,
is dened over pairs in 2S X and it is obtained by restricting Ri only to alternatives in
2S  X: Thus, a rule f can be identied with the collection ffSgS22Nnf?g of rules where
for each S 2 2Nnf?g; fS : RS ! 2S  X: If no confusion can arise, we often omit the
superscript S and write f(RjS):
Consistency For all R 2 R; f (R) = f  RjfN (R).
4 Consistent and internally stable rules
In Bergantiños, Massó and Neme (2016) we characterize the class of all strategy-proof,
unanimous and non-bossy rules as the family of serial dictatorial rules. Here, we consider
situations where the strategic manipulation in the preference revelation game is not an issue
and will look for rules satisfying two meaningful properties in our setting, assuming agents
report truthfully their preferences. Internal stability (no agent, member of the chosen
society, wants to leave it) is a specially interesting property because in most societies,
agents are not obliged to stay in the society if they want to leave it. The second property
is consistency. Assume that the rule f has selected the alternative (S; x) at R 2 R. Thus,
agents in S might want to reconsider again the choice of alternative (S; x). Consistency
says that if f is applied to RjS; the pair (S; x) would be selected again. Hence, members of
the new society S do not need to reconsider the choice (S; x) made by the former society
N:
To look for consistent rules satisfying also internal stability we ask whether three of the
most prominent rules in classical social choice satisfy them. Recall that in the classical
setting the goal is to select an outcome, from a given set X, taking into account the strict
preferences of agents over X: The rules we consider are:
1. Approval voting. Each i 2 N votes for a subset Xi of X: For each outcome x 2
X, compute the number of received votes; namely, jfi 2 N : x 2 Xigj : The outcome
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with more votes is selected. A tie-breaking rule should be applied whenever several
outcomes obtain the largest number of votes.
2. Plurality voting. Each i 2 N votes for an outcome xi 2 X: The outcome with more
votes is selected. A tie-breaking rule should be applied whenever several outcomes
obtain the largest number of votes.
3. Borda method. Each i 2 N ranks all outcomes. Assign a preestablished number of
points to each outcome depending on its position in the order. For each outcome,
compute the sum, over all agents, of the points obtained by such outcome. Select the
outcome with more points. A tie-breaking rule should be applied whenever several
outcomes obtain the largest number of points.
We adapt the three voting methods to our setting, where the set of alternatives is
2N X: In addition, we will have to deal with the indi¤erences arising from property (P.1)
of preference relations.
1. Approval voting. Each i 2 N votes for all a 2 A such that aPi [?]i (if any).
2. Plurality voting. Each i 2 N votes for his top alternative  (Ri). If  (Ri) = [?]i,
assume that i votes for all a 2 [?]i :
3. Borda method. For each i 2 N , consider [?]i as a single alternative in irank. For
each (S; x) 2 A and each i 2 NnS, assign to (S; x) the score obtained by [?]i :
Example 1 below shows that none of these extensions satisfy internal stability.
Example 1 Let R 2 R and x 2 X be such that for all i 2 Nn f1g ;  (Ri) = (N; x),
 (R1) = [?]1 and for each (S; y) with 1 2 S; (N; x)R1 (S; y). Then, the three adapted
voting methods choose (N; x) at R: Nevertheless, (N; x) is not internal stable because
agent 1 prefers to leave the society. 
Since we are interested in identifying rules satisfying internal stability, we modify the
previous methods by considering only pairs (S; x) that are internally stable for each i 2 S
according to Ri; namely, (S; x)Pi [?]i for each i 2 S: In approval voting agents vote only for
pairs that are internally stable. In plurality voting each agent votes for his best internally
stable pair. In a Borda method we consider only the rank, given by the preference, among
the internally stable pairs. With these modications the three methods satisfy internal
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stability by denition. Denote by fAV ; fP and fB Approval voting, the Plurality voting,
and the Borda method, respectively.
Our rst result is negative: plurality voting and Borda method do not satisfy consistency.
To see that, consider Example 2 below.
Example 2 LetN = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g andX = fy1; y2; y3; y4; y5g and consider the following
prole R 2 R: For each i 2 N; (S; x)Pi [?]i whenever i 2 S (namely, all pairs are internally
stable). In addition, R is one among all those proles satisfying the following properties,
where the rst column indicates the rank of each of the six preference relations.
Rank R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6
First (N; y1) (N; y2) (N; y3) (Nn f6g ; y4) (Nn f6g ; y4) (N; y5)
Second (Nn f6g ; y1) (Nn f6g ; y1) (Nn f6g ; y1) (Nn f1g ; y4) (Nn f1g ; y4)
Third (Nn f6g ; y4) (Nn f6g ; y4) (Nn f6g ; y4) (Nn f2g ; y4) (Nn f2g ; y4)
Fourth (Nn f3g ; y4) (Nn f3g ; y4)
Fifth (Nn f6g ; y1) (Nn f6g ; y1)
:
First, plurality voting does not satisfy consistency since fP (R) = (Nn f6g ; y4) but at
the same time fP
 
RjNnf6g

= (Nn f6g ; y1). Consider now the classical denition of
the Borda method where the scores from the worst to the best alternative are given by
0; 1; 2; ::::; k   2; k   1; where k is the number of available alternatives. It is possible to
select a prole R0 satisfying the above rankings in such a way that fB (R0) = (Nn f6g ; y4) :
Besides, fB

R0jNnf6g

= (Nn f6g ; y1) : Hence, this Borda method is not consistent. 
Fortunately, approval voting satises not only consistency but also other desirable prop-
erties. Before stating this result formally we propose a tie-breaking rule, to be used whenever
more than one alternative obtains the highest number of votes. Let  be a monotonic order
over the family of subsets of 2N : Namely, given S; T 2 2N such that S  T , TS: Observe
that NS for all S 6= N:
Fix a monotonic order  over 2N : Denote by fAV; the approval voting that uses 
to break ties. Formally, let A0 = f(Sk; xk)gKk=1 be the set of alternatives that have re-
ceived the largest number of votes according to approval voting at prole R. First select
the society S 2 fS1; :::; SKg ranked higher by  and consider the subset of alternatives
f(Sk0 ; xk0) 2 A0 j Sk0 = Sg : Select now agent i 2 S ranked higher by  (as a singleton set)
and choose nally at R the alternative that is most preferred by i among those in the family
f(Sk0 ; xk0) 2 A0 j Sk0 = Sg :
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Proposition 1 below states that any Approval voting fAV; is consistent and satises
participation and, by Remark 1, internal stability, together with other desirable properties.
Proposition 1 Let  be a monotonic order over 2N : Then, the Approval voting fAV;
satises consistency, e¢ ciency, neutrality and participation. Moreover, in the subdomain
of proles where no tie-breaking rule is needed, fA; also satises anonymity.
Proof of Proposition 1 Observe that if (S; x) is approved by agent i 2 N; then i 2 S:
This fact will be repeatedly used in the proof to show that fAV; satises the properties,
which we consider separately.
 Consistency. Let R 2 R be an arbitrary prole and let (S; x) 2 A be such that
S  fAV;N (R) : The set of agents approving (S; x) at R coincides with the set of agents
approving (S; x) at RjfA;N (R): Hence, it follows that f
AV;(RjfA;N (R)) = f
AV; (R) : Thus,
fAV; satises consistency.
 E¢ ciency. Suppose otherwise; namely, there exist R 2 R and (S; x) 2 A such that
(S; x)Rif
AV; (R) for all i 2 N and (S; x) 6= fAV; (R) : Let i 2 fAV;N (R) : Since fAV;
satises internal stability, fAV; (R)Pi [?]i : Hence, i 2 S and (S; x)PifAV; (R). We
consider two cases. First, assume fAV;N (R)  S: Since for each i 2 SnfAV;N (R) ;
fAV; (R) = [?]i and (S; x)RifAV; (R) it follows that (S; x)Pi [?]i : Thus, all agents
in S approve (S; x), which contradicts the denition of fAV; (R) : Second, assume
fAV;N (R) = S: Thus, f
A;V  (R) = (S; y) with y 6= x and all agents in S approve both,
(S; x) and (S; y) : Hence, the tie-breaking rule  has been used to select fAV; (R) :
Thus, there exists i 2 S such that fAV; (R)Pi (S; x) which is a contradiction.
 Neutrality. Let R 2 R be a prole and  a permutation of X: Observe that for any
(S; x) 2 A the number of agents approving (S; x) at R coincides with the number
of agents approving (S; x) at R: We consider two cases. First, assume it is not
necessary to apply  to select fAV; (R) : Namely, fAV; (R) has been approved at R
by more agents that any other alternative (S; x) : Thus, (fAV;N (R) ; fAV;X (R)) has been
approved at R by more agents that any other alternative (S; x) : Hence, fAV; (R) =
(fAV;N (R) ; fAV;X (R)
): Second, assume it is necessary to apply  to select fAV; (R) :
Let f(Sk; xk)gKk=1 be the set of alternatives receiving the largest number of votes at
R. Thus, f(Sk; xk)gKk=1 is the set of alternatives receiving the largest number of
votes at R. Hence, fAV;N (R) = f
AV;
N (R
) : Now, let i 2 fAV;N (R) be the agent
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with the highest ranking according to  (as a singleton set) and let i0 2 fAV;N (R)
be the agent with the highest ranking according to . Obviously, i0 = i: Thus,
fAV;X (R
) = fAV;X (R)
:
 Participation. By denition, fA; satises internal stability. Hence, by Lemma 1,
fAV; satises participation:
 Anonymity in the proles where no tie-breaking rule is needed. Assume that to select
the alternative at prole R the tie-breaking  is not used. Then, fAV; (R) has been
approved at R by more agents than any other alternative (S; x) : Hence, the number of
agents approving (S; x) at R coincides with the number of agents approving ((S); x)
at R. Thus, ((fAV;N (R)); f
AV;
X (R)) has been approved at R
 by more agents that
any other alternative (S; x) : Hence, fAV; (R) =

(fAV; (R)); fAV;X (R)

; which
means that fAV; satises anonymity at prole R: 
We end the paper by applying the Condorcet winner to our setting. First, we recall the
denition of the Condorcet winner at a prole (over the set of outcomes) in the classical
setting. Fix a prole over X and x; y 2 X: We say that x beats y if the number of agents
preferring x to y is larger that the number of agents preferring y to x: We say that x is
a Condorcet winner (at a prole over X) if there is no y such that y beats x: It could be
the case that no Condorcet winners exists or that there are several Condorcet winners (at
a prole over X). Thus, the Condorcet winner is not a rule according to our denition.
We adapt the notion of a Condorcet winner to our setting as we have already did for
the previous three rules. Fix R 2 R and two di¤erent alternatives (S; x) and (T; y) : All
agents in the set S[T strictly prefer one alternative to the other one while all agents in the
set Nn (S [ T ) are indi¤erent between (S; x) and (T; y) : Thus, (S; x) beats (T; y) at R if
the number of agents strictly preferring (S; x) to (T; y) is larger than the number of agents
strictly preferring (T; y) to (S; x) : In order to ensure that the chosen alternative satises
internal stability at R we only consider alternatives (S; x) satisfying internal stability at R
(namely, for all i 2 S; (S; x)Pi[?]i). When several Condorcet winners exist we apply the
same tie-breaking rule  as in approval voting.
We say that a prole R 2 R is resolute if there is a 2 A such that a beats a0 for all a0 6= a:
Thus, the Condorcet winner selects a atR: Let fC;(R) denote the Condorcet winner (if any)
at R: If R 2 R is resolute, then fC;(R) is independent of  and fC;(R) = 1: Proposition
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2 states that the Condorcet winner at resolute proles satises the same properties as
approval voting, at such proles.
Proposition 2 Let R be a resolute prole. Then, fC;(R) satises consistency, e¢ ciency,
anonymity, neutrality, and participation at R.
Proof of Proposition 2 Fix a resolute prole R and set fC; (R) = (S; x) : We show
that fC;(R) satises the properties at R.
 Consistency. We prove that fC;  RjS = (S; x) by showing that at RjS; (S; x) beats
(T; y) for all (T; y) 6= (S; x) with T  S: Let (T; y) be an alternative with the above
properties. Since (S; x) beats (T; y) at R; the number of agents in N preferring (S; x)
to (T; y) is larger than the number of agents inN preferring (T; y) to (S; x) :Moreover,
each agent in NnS is indi¤erent between (S; x) and (T; y) : Thus the number of agents
in S preferring (S; x) to (T; y) (or (T; y) to (S; x)) coincides with the number of agents
in N preferring (S; x) to (T; y) (or (T; y) to (S; x)): Hence, (S; x) beats (T; y) at RjS:
 E¢ ciency. Suppose otherwise; namely, there exists (T; y) such that (T; y)Ri (S; x) for
all i 2 N and (S; x) 6= (T; y) : Let i 2 S: Since (S; x) satises internal stability; (S; x)Pi [?]i :
Hence, i 2 T and (T; y)Pi (S; x). Each agent in NnT is indi¤erent between (S; x) and
(T; y) : Thus (T; y) beats (S; x) ; which is a contradiction.
 Anonymity. Observe that ((S); x) beats ((T ); y) at R; for each (T; y) 6= (S; x) :
Hence, fC; (R) = ((S); x) ; which means that fC; satises anonymity at prole R:
 Neutrality. Observe that (S; x) beats (T; y) ; at R; for each (T; y) 6= (S; x) : Hence,
fC; (R) = (S; x) ; which means that fC; satises neutrality at R:
 Participation. By denition, fC;(R) satises internal stability at R. By Lemma 1,
fC;(R) satises participation. 
Nevertheless, for proles R that are not resolute the Condorcet winner fC;(R), even
when it is unique, may not satisfy consistency. To see that, consider the following example.
Example 3 Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g ; X = fy1; y2g ; and let  be any monotonic order
satisfying f1g  f2g  f3g  f4g. In addition, take any prole R from all those satisfying the
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following properties, where the rst column indicates the rank of each of the ve preference
relations.
Rank R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
First (Nn f5g ; y1) (Nn f5g ; y1) (Nn f5g ; y2) (Nn f5g ; y2) (N; y1)
Second (Nn f5g ; y2) (Nn f5g ; y2) (N; y1) (N; y1) [?]5
Third (N; y1) (N; y1) (Nn f5g ; y1) (Nn f5g ; y1)
Fourth [?]1 [?]2 [?]3 [?]4
:
The only internally stable alternatives are (Nn f5g ; y1) ; (Nn f5g ; y2) ; and (N; y1) : Notice
that, at R; (Nn f5g ; y1) is tied with (Nn f5g ; y2) ; (Nn f5g ; y2) beats (N; y1) and (N; y1)
beats (Nn f5g ; y1) : Since there exists a unique Condorcet winner, (Nn f5g ; y2) ; it must be
the case that fC; (R) = (Nn f5g ; y2) : The subprole RjNnf5g is given by
RjNnf5g1 RjNnf5g2 RjNnf5g3 RjNnf5g4
First (Nn f5g ; y1) (Nn f5g ; y1) (Nn f5g ; y2) (Nn f5g ; y2)
Second (Nn f5g ; y2) (Nn f5g ; y2) (Nn f5g ; y1) (Nn f5g ; y1)
Third [?]1 [?]2 [?]3 [?]4
:
At RjNnf5g, (Nn f5g ; y1) is tied with (Nn f5g ; y2) : Thus, applying the tie-breaking rule ,
and since agent 1 prefers (Nn f5g ; y1) to (Nn f5g ; y2) ; we have that fC; (R) = (Nn f5g ; y1) ;
which means that fC; does not satisfy consistency. 
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